AMEX Rulemaking:
Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Amending the Audit Committee
Requirements and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated
Approval of Amendments No. 1 and No. 2 Thereto
|
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
(Release No. 34-42232; File No. SR-Amex-99-38)
December 14, 1999
Self-Regulatory Organizations;
Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by the American Stock Exchange
LLC Amending the Exchange's Audit Committee Requirements and Notice
of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Amendments No.
1 and No. 2 Thereto
I. Introduction
On September 20, 1999, the American
Stock Exchange LLC ("Amex" or "Exchange") submitted
to the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission"),
pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
("Act")1 and Rule
19b-4 thereunder,2 a proposed
rule change amending the Exchange's audit committee requirements.
The Federal Register published the proposed
rule change for comment on October 13, 1999.3
In response, the Commission received 12 comment letters.4
On November 15, 1999 and December 9, 1999, the Exchange submitted
Amendments No. 15 and No. 2,6
respectively, to the proposed rule change. This order approves the
proposed rule change and grants accelerated approval to Amendments
No. 1 and No. 2. The Commission is also soliciting comment on Amendments
No. 1 and No. 2 to the proposed rule change.
II. Description of the Proposed Rule Change
A. Background
In February 1999, the Blue Ribbon Committee on
Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees ("Blue
Ribbon Committee") issued a report containing recommendations
aimed at strengthening the independence of the audit committee;
making the audit committee more effective; and addressing mechanisms
for accountability among the audit committee, the outside auditors,
and management.7 In response to the Blue Ribbon Committee's
recommendations, the Exchange proposes to amend its listing standards
regarding audit committee requirements. The proposed changes cover
three general areas: 1) the definition of independence; 2) the structure
and membership of the audit committee; and 3) the audit committee
charter.
The text of the proposed rule change, as amended
by Amendments No. 1 and No. 2, is as follows. Language deleted by
Amendments No. 1 and No. 2 is in brackets. Language added by Amendments
No. 1 and No. 2 is in italics.
Section 121. Independent Directors and Audit Committee
A. Independent Directors:
The Exchange requires that domestic listed companies
have a sufficient number of independent directors to satisfy the
audit committee requirement set forth below. Independent directors
are not officers of the company and are, in the view of the company's
board of directors, free of any relationship that would interfere
with the exercise of independent judgment. The following persons
shall not be considered independent:
- (a) a director who is employed by the corporation or any of
its affiliates for the current year or any of the past three years;
- (b) a director who accepts any compensation from the corporation
or any of its affiliates in excess of $60,000 during the previous
fiscal year, other than compensation for board service, benefits
under a tax-qualified retirement plan, or non-discretionary compensation;
- (c) a director who is a member of the immediate family of an
individual who is, or has been in any of the past three years,
employed by the corporation or any of its affiliates as an executive
officer. Immediate family includes a person's spouse, parents,
children, siblings, mother-in-law, father-in-law, brother-in-law,
sister-in-law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, and anyone
who resides in such person's home;
- (d) a director who is a partner in, or a controlling shareholder
or an executive officer of, any for-profit business organization
to which the corporation made, or from which the corporation received,
payments (other than those arising solely from investments in
the corporation's securities) that exceed 5% of the corporation's
or business organization's consolidated gross revenues for that
year, or $200,000, whichever is more, in any of the past three
years;
- (e) a director who is employed as an executive of another entity
where any of the company's executives serve on that entity's compensation
committee.
B. Audit Committee:
- (a) Charter
- Each Issuer must certify that it has adopted a formal written
audit committee charter and that the Audit Committee has reviewed
and reassessed the adequacy of the formal written charter on an
annual basis. The charter must specify the following:
- (i) the scope of the audit committee's responsibilities, and how
it carries out those responsibilities, including structure, processes,
and membership requirements;
- (ii) the audit committee's responsibility for ensuring its receipt
from the outside auditors of a formal written statement delineating
all relationships between the auditor and the company, consistent
with Independence Standards Board Standard 1, and the audit committee's
responsibility for actively engaging in a dialogue with the auditor
with respect to any disclosed relationships or services that may
impact the objectivity and independence of the auditor and for taking,
or recommending that the full board take, appropriate action to
[ensure] oversee the independence of the outside auditor;
and
- (iii) the outside auditor's ultimate accountability to the board
of directors and the audit committee, as representatives of shareholders,
and these shareholder representatives' ultimate authority and responsibility
to select, evaluate, and, where appropriate, replace the outside
auditor (or to nominate the outside auditor to be proposed for shareholder
approval in any proxy statement).
- (b) Composition
- (i) Each issuer must have, and certify that it has and will continue
to have, an audit committee of at least three members, comprised
solely of independent directors, each of whom is able to read and
understand fundamental financial statements, including a company's
balance sheet, income statement, and cash flow statement or will
become able to do so within a reasonable period of time after his
or her appointment to the audit committee. Additionally, each issuer
must certify that it has, and will continue to have, at least one
member of the audit committee that has past employment experience
in finance or accounting, requisite professional certification in
accounting, or any other comparable experience or background which
results in the individual's financial sophistication, including
being or having been a chief executive officer, chief financial
officer or other senior officer with financial oversight responsibilities.
- (ii) Notwithstanding paragraph (i), one director who is not independent
as defined in [Rule 4200] Section 121A , and is not a current
employee or an immediate family member of such employee, may be
appointed to the audit committee, if the board, under exceptional
and limited circumstances, determines that membership on the committee
by the individual is required by the best interests of the corporation
and its shareholders, and the board discloses, in the next annual
proxy statement subsequent to such determination, the nature of
the relationship and the reasons for that determination.
- (iii) Exception for Small Business Filers -- Paragraphs (b)(i)
and (b)(ii) do not apply to issuers that file reports under SEC
Regulation S-B. Such issuers must establish and maintain an Audit
Committee of at least two members, a majority of the members of
which shall be independent directors.
B. Independence
The Exchange proposes to narrow its current definition of "independent
director" by specifying five new relationships that could impair
a director's independent judgment as a result of financial, familial,
or other material ties to management or the corporation. The proposed
definition will apply to all directors, not just those serving on
audit committees. Under the proposed rule change, directors with
any of the following five relationships will not be considered independent:
(1) employment by the corporation or any of its affiliates for the
current year or any of the past three years; (2) acceptance of any
compensation from the corporation or any of its affiliates in excess
of $60,000 during the previous fiscal year, other than compensation
for board service, benefits under a tax-qualified retirement plan,
or non-discretionary compensation; (3) member of the immediate family
of an individual who is, or has been in any of the past three years,
employed by the corporation or any of its affiliates as an executive
officer; (4) partnership in, or a controlling shareholder or an
executive officer of, any for-profit business organization to which
the corporation made, or from which the corporation received, payments
(other than those arising solely from investments in the corporation's
securities) that exceed five percent of the corporation's or business
organization's consolidated gross revenues for that year, or $200,000,
whichever is more, in any of the past three years; or (5) employment
as an executive of another entity where any of the company's executives
serve on that entity's compensation committee.
C. Structure and Membership of the
Audit Committee
The Exchange also proposes to change the structure and membership
qualifications of the audit committee. Specifically, the Exchange
proposes to change the required composition of the audit committee
from at least two to at least three members. Furthermore, the audit
committee must be comprised solely of independent directors rather
than a majority of independent directors. The Exchange is conscious
of the fact that, in exceptional circumstances, issuers may appropriately
conclude that it would be in the best interests of the corporation
for a non-independent director to serve on the audit committee.
In such exceptional and limited circumstances, a non-independent
director can serve on the audit committee, provided that the board
determines that it is required by the best interests of the corporation
and its shareholders, and the board discloses its reasons for the
determination in the next annual proxy statement. Due to the nature
of this exception, however, a corporation could have no more than
one non-independent director serving on its audit committee. Also,
current employees or officers, or their immediate family members,
may not serve on the audit committee under this exception.
As a result of the audit committee's responsibility
for a corporation's accounting and financial reporting, the Exchange
believes that audit committee members should have a basic understanding
of financial statements. Therefore, the proposed rule change requires
each member of the audit committee to be able to read and understand
fundamental financial statements, including a company's balance
sheet, income statement, and cash flow statement, or become able
to do so within a reasonable period of time after his or her appointment
to the audit committee. Furthermore, in order to further enhance
the effectiveness of the audit committee, at least one member of
the audit committee must have past employment experience in finance
or accounting, requisite professional certification in accounting,
or any other comparable experience or background that results in
the individual's financial sophistication, including being or having
been a chief executive officer, chief financial officer, or other
senior officer with financial oversight responsibilities.
The Exchange is sensitive to the potential burden
that the proposed changes to the audit committee composition requirements
may place on small companies. Therefore, the Exchange proposes to
exempt those corporations that file under SEC Regulation S-B from
these proposed changes ("Small Business Filers").8 Small Business Filers will be held to
the existing Exchange requirements with respect to audit committee
composition, that is, they must maintain an audit committee of at
least two members, a majority of whom are independent.
D. Charter
The Exchange believes that a written charter will help the audit
committee as well as management and the corporation's auditors recognize
the function of the audit committee and the relationship among these
parties. The proposed rule change requires each issuer to adopt
a formal written charter. This charter must specify the scope of
the audit committee's responsibilities, and how the committee carries
out those responsibilities, including structure, processes, and
membership requirements. In addition, the charter must specify the
audit committee's responsibility for ensuring its receipt from the
outside auditors of a formal written statement delineating all relationships
between the auditor and the company, consistent with Independence
Standards Board Standard 1.9
The charter must specify the audit committee's responsibility for
actively engaging in a dialogue with the auditor with respect to
any disclosed relationships or services that may impact the objectivity
and independence of the auditor and for taking, or recommending
that the full board take, appropriate action to oversee the independence
of the outside auditor. Finally, it must specify the outside auditor's
ultimate accountability to the board of directors and the audit
committee, as representatives of shareholders, and these shareholder
representatives' ultimate authority and responsibility to select,
evaluate, and, where appropriate, replace the outside auditor (or
to nominate an outside for shareholder approval in any proxy statement).
The proposed rule change requires issuers to review their charter
on an annual basis.
E. Implementation
In order to minimize disruption to existing issuer audit committees,
to permit current audit committee members to serve out their terms,
and to allow adequate time to recruit the requisite members, the
Exchange proposes to provide its issuers listed as of the effective
date of the proposed rule change eighteen months after the proposed
rule change is approved by the Commission to meet the audit committee
structure and membership requirements.
Additionally, the Exchange proposes that issuers
listed as of the effective date of the rule change be provided six
months following the date of Commission approval of the proposed
rule change to adopt a formal written audit committee charter as
required by proposed Section 121(B)(a) of the Amex Company Guide
.10
Further, for issuers that applied for listing prior
to the effective date of the proposed rule change, the Exchange
proposes that they be able to qualify for listing under the listing
standards in force at the time of their application, and to receive
the same grace periods provided to currently listed issuers, as
described above. Also, in order to avoid prejudicing issuers that
transfer to the Exchange from Nasdaq and the New York Stock Exchange,
the Exchange proposes that these issuers be afforded the same grace
periods they would have received under their previous market's implementation
schedule.
III. Comments
As of December 9, 1999, the Commission received 12 comment letters
on the proposed rule change.11
In general, the commenters favored the proposed rule change but
recommended certain modifications. One commenter stated that it
does not support the new rules.12
In particular, the CII supports the new requirements,
but stated that the proposed override provision, which allows a
company's board to include a non-independent director on the audit
committee is not appropriate because companies should not have a
problem finding financially literate, truly independent directors.13 In addition, the AFL-CIO stated that
the restriction period for former employees, or relatives of former
employees, should be five years instead of three years.14
The AFL-CIO also stated that the $60,000 threshold to disqualify
a candidate because of a significant business relationship is not
stringent enough.15 Another
commenter, on the other hand, stated that a quantitative test is
too inflexible.16 Keller and Rowe stated that former
non-executive employment should be treated as a significant business
relationship.17 Keller and
Rowe also stated that consultants who receive from the company more
than a de minimis amount of compensation should be treated
as employees, while consultants who do not should be treated as
having a business relationship with the company.18 According to this comment letter,
the company's board should be permitted to determine that the compensation
does not impair the director's objectivity. Keller and Rowe also
objected to the financial expertise requirement and stated that
no director will want to be designated the financial expert because
of the added exposure to liability.19
Deloitte stated that requiring a company's board
or audit committee to "ensure" the independence of the
outside auditor goes beyond what can reasonably be expected of the
board and the audit committee in their oversight role.20 Deloitte suggested that the Exchange
replace the word "ensure" with "monitor" or
"actively oversee."21 E&Y supported the proposed rule
change, but stated that the Exchange should not exempt Small Business
Filers from the financial literacy and expertise requirements and
also should expand its definition of immediate family member to
include sons-in-law and daughters-in-law.22
NYSBA stated that the company's board should be required to adopt
the audit committee charter, rather than the audit committee adopting
the charter subject to board approval.23 NYSBA also opposed requiring the audit
committee to evaluate and reassess the adequacy of the audit committee
on an annual basis because there is no standard to measure the adequacy
of the charter.24
APTC stated that the proposed rule change will
be counter productive to the goal of better audit committees.25
In addition, APTC stated that the proposed rule change will disadvantage
smaller companies more than larger companies, but concluded that
it is appropriate to apply the proposed rule change to all companies,
regardless of size.26 Moreover,
APTC is opposed to the proposal's financial literacy requirement.27
APTC believes that the financial literacy requirement may deprive
audit committees of the service of individuals with "exceptional
character and/or operational experience."28
The commenter suggested that the Exchange replace this requirement
with a requirement that the committee as a whole possess a certain
level of financial acumen.29
In addition, the NVCA stated that the proposed
rule change should exclude venture capital investors from the independence
qualifications.30 The NVCA also stated that the proposed
rule change should give companies that have just completed an initial
public offering eighteen months to comply with the new requirements
and that the exemption for Small Business Filers should be expanded
to apply to companies with less than $50 million in revenue.31
Finally, three commenters stated that the proposed
rule change should not apply to closed-end investment companies.32
ICI and MSDW noted that closed-end investment companies are adequately
regulated under the 1940 Act.33
These two commenters also stated that the potential abuses that
the proposed rule change is designed to address do not exist with
respect to closed-end investment funds, because the assets of closed-end
funds consist exclusively of investment securities and thus there
is no opportunity to "manage" earnings or results through
the selective application of accounting policies.34
IV. Discussion
The Commission finds that the proposed rule change is consistent
with the requirements of the Act and the rules and regulations thereunder
applicable to a national securities exchange,35
and, in particular, the requirements of Section 6(b)(5) of the Act.36
The Commission believes that the proposed rule change will protect
investors by improving the effectiveness of audit committees of
companies listed on the Exchange. The Commission also believes that
the new requirements will enhance the reliability and credibility
of financial statements of companies listed on the Exchange by making
it more difficult for companies to inappropriately distort their
true financial performance. Further, the Commission notes that the
Exchange is amending its own listing standards, which is a function
within the Exchange's discretion, as long as those changes are consistent
with the Act.
Specifically, the Commission believes that the
proposed definition of independence will promote the quality and
reliability of a company's financial statements. The Commission
believes that directors without financial, familial, or other material
personal ties to management will be more likely to objectively evaluate
the propriety of management's accounting, internal control, and
financial reporting practices. For these reasons, the Commission
believes that the proposal's prohibition against employees serving
on the audit committee is appropriate and that the Exchange should
not be required to distinguish between executive and non-executive
employees.37
The Commission also believes that the proposed
provision that permits a company to appoint one director to its
audit committee who is not independent, if the board determines
that membership on the committee by the individual is required by
the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders, adequately
balances the need for objective, independent directors with the
company's need for flexibility in exceptional and unusual circumstances.
The Commission believes that the requirement that the company disclose
in its next proxy statement the nature of the director's relationship
to the issuer and the board's reasons for determining the appointment
was in the best interests of the corporation will adequately guard
against abuse of the proposed exception to the independence requirement.
Moreover, the Commission believes that the $60,000 threshold to
determine if a potential audit committee director has a significant
business relationship with the company is a reasonable measure to
balance the company's need to recruit audit committee members with
the independence requirement.38
The Commission does not believe that venture capital
investors should be excluded from the Exchange's definition of independence.
The Commission does not view the proposed rule change as posing
an undue hardship on venture capital firms or companies listed on
the Amex. The Commission notes that the proposed rule change will
only prohibit venture capital investors from sitting on a company's
audit committee if the investor does not fall within the Exchange's
definition of independent. The proposed rule change will not prohibit
previously eligible investors from serving on the company's board.
The Commission also notes that a venture capital investor that is
not considered independent may serve on the company's audit committee,
if the board determines it is in the best interests of the corporation
and its shareholders and the company discloses its reasons for the
determination and the nature of the director's relationship to the
company in its next annual proxy statement.
In addition, the Commission believes that requiring
companies to adopt formal written charters specifying the audit
committee's responsibilities, and how it carries out those responsibilities,
will help the audit committee, management, investors, and the company's
auditors recognize the function of the audit committee and the relationship
among the parties. Moreover, the Commission believes that requiring
the charter to specify that the audit committee is responsible for
taking, or recommending that the company's full board take, appropriate
action to oversee the independence of the outside auditor will make
it more likely that companies will select objective, unbiased auditors.
The Commission believes that the proposed rule
change's compositional requirement that each issuer have an audit
committee composed of three independent directors who are able to
read and understand fundamental financial statements will enhance
the effectiveness of the audit committee and help to ensure that
audit committee members are able to adequately fulfill their responsibilities.
The Commission believes that requiring each audit committee member
to satisfy this standard will help to ensure that the committee
as a whole is financially literate.39
Moreover, the Commission considers that requiring one member of
the audit committee to have past employment experience in finance
or accounting, requisite professional certification in accounting,
or any other comparable experience or background that indicates
the individual's financial sophistication, will further enhance
the effectiveness of the audit committee in carrying out its financial
oversight responsibilities. In addition, the Commission does not
believe that companies will experience undue difficulty recruiting
an audit committee member that satisfies the financial expertise
requirements. Moreover, the Commission believes that the proposed
rule change appropriately exempts Small Business Filers from the
proposed composition requirements because these companies may experience
more difficulty meeting these enhanced requirements. The Commission
notes that these companies will remain subject to existing Exchange
rules on audit committees, which require an audit committee to have
at least two members, a majority of whom are independent.
Moreover, the Commission has concluded that the
Exchange's decision to include investment companies in the proposed
rule change is warranted. While the Commission recognizes that the
opportunity for some types of financial reporting abuses may be
limited by the nature of fund assets,40
it believes that audit committees do play an important role in overseeing
the financial reporting process for investment companies.
The Commission finds good cause for approving Amendments
No. 1 and No. 2 to the proposed rule change prior to the thirtieth
day after publication in the Federal Register . The Commission
notes that Amendment No. 1 revises the implementation time periods
for the proposed rule change solely to provide greater clarity to
issuers and to investors. The Commission believes that Amendment
No. 1 will enable issuers to determine when they must comply with
the new requirements and will enable investors to determine when
to rely on the protections afforded by the proposed rule change.
The Commission notes that Amendment No. 2 simply clarifies that
the audit committee is required to oversee, rather than ensure,
the independence of the company's outside auditors; makes a technical
correction to Section 121A; and expands the Exchange's definition
of "immediate family." The Commission believes that accelerated
approval will allow the Exchange to simultaneously make all relevant
modifications to the Amex Company Guide and will avoid potential
confusion. Accordingly, the Commission finds good cause to accelerate
approval of Amendments No. 1 and No. 2 to the proposed rule change,
consistent with Sections 6(b)(5)41
and 19(b)42 of the Act.
V. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to submit written
data, views and arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether
the proposed rule change is consistent with the Act. Persons making
written submissions should file six copies thereof with the Secretary,
Securities and Exchange Commission, 450 Fifth Street, N.W., Washington,
D.C. 20549-0609. Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments,
all written statements with respect to the proposed rule change
that are filed with the Commission, and all written communications
relating to the proposed rule change between the Commission and
any person, other than those that may be withheld from the public
in accordance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available
for inspection and copying in the Commission's Public Reference
Room. Copies of such filing will also be available for inspection
and copying at the principal office of the Amex. All submissions
should refer to the File No. SR-Amex-99-38 and should be submitted
by [insert date 21 days from the date of publication].
VI. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Commission finds
that the Exchange's proposal to amend its audit committee requirements
is consistent with the requirements of the Act and the rules and
regulations thereunder.
It is therefore ordered , pursuant to Section
19(b)(2) of the Act,43 that
the amended proposed rule change (SR-Amex-99-38) is approved.
For the Commission, by the Division of Market Regulation,
pursuant to delegated authority.44
Jonathan G. Katz
Secretary
FOOTNOTES:
| 1 |
15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1). |
| 2 |
17 CFR 240.19b-4. |
| 3 |
Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 41981 (Oct. 6, 1999), 64 FR 55505. The Nasdaq Stock Market,
Inc. and The New York Stock Exchange, Inc. have proposed rule
changes relating to audit committees. See Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 41982 (Oct. 6, 1999), 64 FR 55510 (Oct. 13, 1999)("Nasdaq
Proposal"), and Securities Exchange Act Release No. 41980
(Oct. 6, 1999), 64 FR 55514 (Oct. 13, 1999) ("NYSE Proposal"). |
| 4 |
Most commenters favored the proposed
rule change but recommended certain modifications to the proposed
rules. The comment letters are discussed in Section III of this
order. |
| 5 |
Letter from Robert E. Aber, Senior
Vice President and General Counsel, Nasdaq-Amex Market Group,
to Richard Strasser, Assistant Director, Division of Market Regulation
("Division"), Commission, dated November 12, 1999 ("Amendment
No. 1"). The Exchange submitted Amendment No. 1 to require
issuers listed as of the effective date of Commission approval
of the proposed rule change to adopt a formal written audit committee
charter within six months of the effective date of the proposed
rule change. As originally filed, the proposed rule change required
issuers to adopt the required charter within eighteen months of
the effective date of the proposed rule change. Amendment No.
1 also states that issuers that applied for listing prior to the
effective date of the proposed rule change would qualify for listing
under the listing standards in force at the time of their application,
and receive the same grace periods provided to currently listed
issuers. |
| 6 |
Letter from Sara Nelson Bloom,
Associate General Counsel, Nasdaq-Amex Market Group, to Richard
Strasser, Assistant Director, Division, Commission, dated December
8, 1999 ("Amendment No. 2"). The Exchange submitted
Amendment No. 2 to revise proposed Section 121B(a)(ii) of the
Amex Company Guide to provide that the audit committee
is required to oversee the independence of the outside auditor,
rather than ensure the independence of the outside auditor. Amendment
No. 2 also revises the Exchange's definition of immediate family
found in Section 121A(c) to include sons-in-law and daughters-in-law.
Finally, Amendment No. 2 corrects a technical error in proposed
Section 121B(b)(ii) by replacing a reference to Rule 4200 with
a reference to Section 121A. |
| 7 |
Report and Recommendations
of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of
Corporate Audit Committees (1999) . A copy of this Report
[Webmaster note: in PDF format] can be found on-line at www.nasdaqnews.com. |
| 8 |
Small Business Filer is defined
by Regulation S-B as an issuer that: (i) has revenue of less than
$25,000,000; (ii) is a U.S. or Canadian issuer; and (iii) if a
majority owned subsidiary, the parent corporation is a small business
issuer. 17 CFR 228.10(a)(1). |
| 9 |
Independence Standard No. 1,
Independence Discussions with Audit Committees (January 1999),
which can be found on-line at www.cpaindependence.org. |
| 10 |
See Amendment No. 1, supra
n. 5 . |
| 11 |
See letters from: Ernst
& Young LLP ("E&Y") dated November 1, 1999;
Dorsey & Whitney LLP ("Dorsey") (on behalf of nine
closed-end investment management companies whose stock is listed
on the Exchange) dated October 28, 1999; Deloitte & Touche
LLP ("Deloitte") dated November 3, 1999; Council of
Institutional Investors ("CII") dated November 8, 1999;
Brian T. Borders on behalf of the National Venture Capital Association
("NVCA") dated November 12, 1999; Investment Company
Institute ("ICI") dated November 3, 1999; American Federation
of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations ("AFL-CIO")
dated November 29, 1999; Mayer, Brown & Platt on behalf of
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter ("MSDW") dated November 29,
1999; Association of Publicly Traded Companies ("APTC")
dated December 6, 1999; Robert A. Profusek ("Profusek")
dated December 3, 1999; Stanley Keller and Richard Rowe ("Keller
and Rowe") dated December 7, 1999; and The Committee on Securities
Regulation of the Business Law Section of the New York State Bar
Association ("NYSBA") dated December 1, 1999. |
| 12 |
APTC Letter at 2. |
| 13 |
CII Letter, at 2; see also
AFL-CIO Letter at 2. |
| 14 |
AFL-CIO Letter at 2. |
| 15 |
Id. |
| 16 |
Profusek Letter at 2. In addition,
Keller and Rowe stated that this provision might preclude a number
of highly qualified candidates from serving on audit committees.
Keller and Rowe Letter at 3. |
| 17 |
Keller and Rowe Letter at 2. |
| 18 |
Id . at 3. |
| 19 |
Id. ; see also
NYSBA Letter at 6. |
| 20 |
Deloitte Letter, at 1. |
| 21 |
Id. at 2. |
| 22 |
E&Y Letter at 4. |
| 23 |
NYSBA Letter at 2. |
| 24 |
Id. at 4-5. |
| 25 |
APTC Letter at 2. |
| 26 |
Id. at 3. |
| 27 |
Id. at 4-5. |
| 28 |
Id. |
| 29 |
Id. at 5. |
| 30 |
NVCA Letter at 5. |
| 31 |
Id. at 4. |
| 32 |
ICI Letter at 2; MSDW Letter
at 1; Keller and Rowe Letter at 5. In addition, Keller and Rowe
stated that the proposed rule change should exempt all investment
companies because their audit committee members are already required
not to be "interested persons" as that term is defined
in Section 2(a)(9) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("1940
Act"). Moreover, Dorsey supported the application of the
proposed rule change to investment companies. Dorsey Letter at
3. |
| 33 |
ICI Letter at 3-4; MSDW Letter
at 2. |
| 34 |
ICI Letter at 3; MSDW Letter
at 1. ICI and MSDW also noted that the independent accountants
of investment funds are selected by the independent directors
of the fund. |
| 35 |
In approving the proposal, the
Commission has considered its impact on efficiency, competition,
and capital formation. 15 U.S.C. 78c(f). |
| 36 |
15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5). |
| 37 |
See Keller and Rowe Letter
at 2. |
| 38 |
The Commission does not believe
that the Exchange should require its listed companies to adopt
a separate provision on consultants. See Keller and Rowe
Letter at 3. |
| 39 |
See APTC Letter at 5. |
| 40 |
See Keller and Rowe Letter
at 5; ICI Letter at 3; MSDW Letter at 1. |
| 41 |
15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5). |
| 42 |
15 U.S.C. 78s(b). |
| 43 |
15. U.S.C. 78s(b)(2). |
| 44 |
17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12). |
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sros/am9938o.htm
Last update: 12/16/1999
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