The Austrian Unabhängige Finanzsenat referred a number of questions to the ECJ about the exclusion of foreign VAT entrepreneurs of the special scheme for small enterprises. This exclusion follows from article 24(3) of the Sixth Directive, currently article 283(1)(c) of the VAT Directive ("the exclusion articles"). Although the Finanzsenat asked the ECJ for a preliminary ruling, the questions were almost rhetorical as a result of the extensive reasoning of the Austrian court.
In this case, Ingrid Schmelz, a resident of Germany, has a house which she rents out in Austria. She wants to apply the special scheme for small entrepreneurs in Austria; this scheme would fully exempt her small turnover in Austria. However, according to the exclusion articles, she cannot apply the scheme because she is not an Austrian resident.
First, the Finanzsenat wants to know whether this exclusion of foreign VAT entrepreneurs is in conflict with the prohibition of discrimination (article 12 of the EC Treaty), the freedom of establishment (article 43 of the EC Treaty), the freedom to provide services (article 49 of the EC Treaty) and the principle of equality. More specifically, the Finanzsenat wonders whether this exclusion can be declared void in accordance with Art. 234(1)(b) EC, which gives the ECJ the right to judge the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community and the ECB.
Because of the application of the exclusion articles, foreign VAT-entrepreneurs are clearly put in a disadvantage compared to domestic VAT entrepreneurs. As explained in different cases (amongst others Grzelczyk (C-184/99) and National Farmers Union (C-354/95)), comparable situations must not be treated differently and different situations must not be treated in the same way, unless such treatment is objectively justified. Furthermore, VAT entrepreneurs are limited in their freedom of establishment when their activities are only exempted in case the entrepreneur is an inhabitant of the Member State concerned, because local suppliers would lose their right to apply the special scheme if they would move to another Member State. A resident restriction also limits the freedom to provide services, because it hinders taxpayers to supply their services to other Member States, when only their local competitors can apply the special scheme. Because of this, the exclusion articles could very well be in conflict with the EC-treaty.
In addition, the Austrian court notes that article 24 of the Sixth Directive (article 297 of the VAT Directive) stipulates that EU Member States can exempt the turnover from VAT until a certain threshold is reached. The Finanzsenat therefore wants to know whether this threshold is based on the turnover of the taxpayer in one EU Member State, or whether the threshold is based on the turnover in the whole European Union.
With reference to the last question, the Finanzsenat concludes that the exemption should probably be applied on the domestic turnover and not on the turnover gained in the whole European Union.
Although the application of the domestic turnover per country could cause an accumulation of benefits from applying the special scheme in several Member States, this would be in line with the system of the VAT Directive, as the taxation of economic activities takes place in the country where these activities are assigned to.
Although the special scheme for small entrepreneurs might be irrelevant for most of our firms’ clients, the thorough and convincing judgment of the Austrian court in this case can be seen as a milestone in the EU VAT landscape.
Finally the principle that a Directive can be in breach with the EU Treaty is raised for VAT. If the ECJ indeed decides that the special scheme for small entrepreneurs is in breach of the treaty when it concerns taxpayers from other Member States (and this should not be a surprise), this could open the door for further claims in other areas. One possible claim that comes to mind first and foremost is of course why the Directive limits VAT grouping to members that are established in one particular Member State (as confirmed in the Communication recently issued by the EU Commission). Cross-border VAT grouping would allow companies closely bound to another but established in various Member States to benefit from the main advantages of VAT grouping currently applied on a national basis by some countries, such as the reduction of financial burden, the neutralization of some of the VAT costs and some administrative simplifications. That is why especially VAT exempt industries, like the financial services industry, should follow the developments of this case closely.
This is an extremely important referral as it not only addresses the question of whether an arrangement such as that introduced by Weald Leasing is abusive but whether an arrangement to create a cash flow benefit is contrary to the purpose of the Directive.
The benefit being achieved in this case by creating a leasing structure to defer the time irrecoverable VAT was incurred by a partly exempt customer, connected to Weald Leasing. The High Court in the UK had previously found for the taxpayer despite finding the arrangement to be artificial and entered into for the sole purpose of creating a tax advantage. This of course satisfied the second test in Halifax plc (Case C-255/02), but not the first, with the High Court finding that deferring irrecoverable VAT was not contrary to the purpose of the Directive. This arguably was a sensible conclusion to reach on the basis that VAT was declared on the lease supplies and recovery of the VAT amount charged was duly restricted by the customer.
The questions put to the ECJ unsurprisingly include whether the arrangements put in place are contrary to the purpose of the Directive, and whether it is abusive to enter into arrangements where leasing is not part of a businesses normal commercial operations (as was the case with Weald Leasing). The questions extend to that which seeks a definition of normal commercial operations and where abuse does apply, how the transactions should be redefined.
If the ECJ answers the questions such that creating cash flow benefits is not abusive, it could open the door for implementing arrangements to achieve cash flow savings.
Reference for a preliminary ruling C-86/09 (Future Health Technologies, exemption for medical services.
The questions referred to the ECJ seek to establish whether the services performed by Future Health Technologies are exempt from VAT.
What Future Health Technologies did was collect stem cells, process them and then store for future medical use. The question therefore is whether those type of services fall within the expression of hospital and medical care or a closely related activity to such care. Alternatively, could the same services fall within the description of medical care if carried out by or under the supervision of one or more suitably qualified medical professionals.
Member States, particularly the UK have been found to restrict the exemptions too narrowly when the interpretation of the exemption schedule has been challenged before the ECJ in the past. It should be of no surprise if the services provided by Future Health Technologies is found to be exempt - or is this a step too far? If indeed the findings of the Court favor the taxpayer, further exemptions may well be sought by providers of medically related services.
The French Supreme Tax Court has asked the ECJ to define what criteria are to be used to determine whether reprographics is a supply of goods or a provision of services for VAT purposes.
The Administrative Court of Appeal held that the criterion to be retained is the importance of the material means used for the activity of reprographics and that in the particular case; the material means were superior to the creative aspect of the supply of reprographics. As a consequence, the Administrative Court has concluded that reprographics is a delivery of goods. The French Tax Doctrine also refers to a material criterion which is the number of copies produced.
The Court of Appeal and the French Tax Doctrine’s positions are not in line with the criterion that was used by the French Supreme Tax Court and the ECJ by the past on similar issues:
- The French Supreme Tax Court did not retain the importance of the material means involved but appreciated the material aspect of the supplied good in cases related to the supply of material support for communication or the supply of mould for bottle of perfume;
- The ECJ considered that the sale of an artistic object consists in a delivery of good (C-169/00).
The question referred here to the ECJ should help clarifying the qualification of reprographics and, more generally specify which criteria must be used to distinguish between supply of service and delivery of goods.
The Bundesfinanzhof in Germany referred a question to the ECJ about the exemption for betting, lotteries and other forms of gambling (article 135(1)(i) of the VAT Directive).
In this case, the German company Leo Libera exploits an arcade of gambling machines and wanted to apply the exemption of art. 135(1)(i) of the VAT Directive. However, according to the German VAT law, this exemption is only applicable to the activities mentioned in the Rennwett- und Lotteriegesetz (law of races and lotteries). Because gambling machines are not listed in this Rennwett- und Lotteriegesetz, Leo Libera cannot apply the exemption.
During the parliamentary proceedings of the German law, representatives of parliament wondered whether the exclusion of other forms of gambling than in the Rennwett- und Lotteriegesetz is in line with the VAT Directive. Their concern was that the greater part of all the gambling games in Germany is excluded from this exemption. On the one hand, the VAT Directive does not limit the extent of gambling games that can be excluded from the exemption (see also the Opinion in the Glawe case, paragraph 10) and the Directive does mention explicitly that Member States can implement conditions and limitations. On the other hand, when most gambling games are excluded, both in number and revenue, the Bundesfinanzhof doubts whether Germany crossed a line with the extensive limitation of the exemption. The Bundesfinanzhof therefore refers the following question to the ECJ:
Is article135 (1)(i) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2005 on the common system of value added tax to be interpreted as meaning that Member States are permitted to have a rule by which only specified forms of (race) betting and lotteries are exempt from tax, and all 'other forms of gambling' are excluded from the tax exemption?
On 1 April 2009, the German Federal Tax Court decided to refer several questions to the ECJ concerning the place of supply of human cell proliferation by cell culturing by order of other taxable persons resident abroad and to the use of their VAT ID number.
The plaintiff is resident in Germany and is engaged in tissue engineering. It takes cells from parts of cartilage (Biopsat) which had been provided by foreign medical institutions for cell proliferation by cell culturing. Subsequently, the cells are returned to the respective patient for implantation. The plaintiff argues that the turnovers have to be qualified as Article 55-services according to the VAT Directive which are not subject to German VAT in case the client is resident in another European member state and uses its national VAT ID number.
- if cell proliferation for implantation purposes can be qualified as “work” on movable tangible property as defined by Article 55 VAT Directive;
- whether a service is already rendered to the client under his VAT ID number if the clients’ VAT ID number is shown on the supplier’s invoice but an explicit agreement about the use of the number was not made.
Alternatively, the court asks if Article 132 VAT Directive could be interpreted as meaning that the separation of cartilage and the subsequent cell proliferation qualify as “provision of medical care” if the gained cells are re-implanted in the donor.
The reference of the German court shows that tissue engineering relates to several basic principles of VAT. The first question is whether tissue engineering is a supply of goods (the cells) or a supply of services (the engineering). If the latter applies - which is more likely - it is questionable whether the services are Article 55-services. This requires a tangible asset which is processed. The German court is of the opinion that human cells are tangible assets in this context (like human organs and blood) and that the processing is not comparable with the (intellectual or scientific) work of a physician (like in the ECJ's Linthorst decision, C-167/95). The question regarding the use of VAT numbers concerns the strict interpretation of German law which requires an "active usage" of the VAT number by the recipient when ordering the services. The German court assumes that the current German regulation is not in accordance with the VAT Directive. Just in case Art. 55 does not apply the court wants to know whether the services are tax-exempt. This question is also relevant for recipients in third countries. However, from 2010 on the place of supply is generally deemed to be where the recipient resides. Direct contractual relations between the tissue engineering company and the patient are not to be expected in practice because tissue engineering companies most commonly work for physicians and hospitals.
Top